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Self-Interest, Public Interest, and the
Interests of the Absent Client: Legal
Ethics and Class Action Praxis
JASMINKA KALAJDZIC*
Are existing ethical norms adequate to address the realities of class proceedings? In this
article, the author explores the premise that current rules of professional conduct are effective
when applied to class action praxis. In Part I, she discusses the peculiar features of class
proceedings and how they create unique challenges to the ethical conduct of litigation. In
Part II, the author confronts a fundamental land often overlooked) question: Who is the client
in a class proceeding to whom ethical duties are owed? Having identified the range of judicial
and academic views on the unique dimensions of class actions, she turns, in Part III, to a
discussion of two sources of ethical norms that seek to respond to them: the strictures of
class proceedings legislation and the judicial development of rules and guidelines. Throughout
the article, the author relies upon information obtained from seven judges interviewed for this
project. The article concludes with proposals for amendment to Ontario's Rules of Professional
Conduct that would more accurately address the realities of this model of litigation.
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I have the greatest law practice in the world. I have no clients.1
WHEN THE ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION (OLRC) recommended that
class proceedings legislation be enacted, it did so cognizant of the many ethical
questions to which class actions as an institution, and class action lawyering as
praxis, give rise. In its voluminous and pivotal report, the OLRC also concluded,
with uncharacteristic brevity, that the ethical guidelines that typically govern
single plaintiff proceedings are ineffective in class actions.' Yet the difficulties of
integrating class action procedure with existing legal ethics rules did not serve
as an indictment of class proceedings. Rather, they reflected a need for the rules
1. Bill Lerach, formerly of Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, as quoted in William
P Barrett, "I Have No Clients," Forbes 152:8 (11 October 1993) 52 at 53. For over two
decades, Lerach's firm was the most successful plaintiffs' class action firm in the United
States. Between 2007 and 2008, he and his partners Mel Weiss and Dave Bershad, along
with fourteen other lawyers and clients, pled guilty to federal conspiracy charges for making
secret payments to named plaintiffs recruited for their class actions. Lerach served two years
in federal prison and has since been disbarred.
2. Report on Class Actions, vol 1 (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, 1982) at
201-02 [OLRC Report vol 1].
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themselves to change. Any such adjustments of traditional rules to accommodate
representative litigation, wrote the commissioners, should be undertaken by the
Law Society of Upper Canada (LSUC). 3
Almost twenty years after the Ontario Legislature passed class proceedings
legislation," the LSUC has not taken up the OLRC's suggestion to modify its
Rules of Professional Conduct.' While rules of conduct are not the only-or even
the most important-source of ethical guidelines, they do set standards and
exercise some normative pull as to how the profession conducts itself. Moreover,
to be most effective, rules of conduct should be responsive; if the law or its practice
changes, the codes governing lawyers' conduct should change with it.
In this article, I explore the OLRC's premise that existing ethical rules are
ineffective when applied to the conduct of class action litigation. To do so, I draw
upon extensive US literature on the subject as well as upon Canadian jurisprudence
and original research involving interviews of seven class action judges on ques-
tions of class action legal ethics. In Part I, I discuss the peculiar features of class
proceedings and how they create unique-or exacerbate existing-challenges to
the ethical conduct of litigation. Where appropriate, I refer to areas of tension
between rules of professional conduct 6 and class action praxis. In Part II, I confront
the fundamental (and often overlooked) question: Who is the client to whom
ethical duties are owed in a class proceeding? Varying answers to this question
can be gleaned from the jurisprudence and from scholarly commentary in both
the United States and Canada. My brief survey reveals an important divergence
of views in the two jurisdictions on this fundamental question.
Having identified the range of judicial and academic views on the unique
dimensions of class actions, I then turn in Part III to a discussion of the development
of ethical rules that seek to respond to these views. In the absence of amendments
to formal rules of conduct, what are the sources of class counsel's role morality?'
I discuss two: the strictures of class proceedings legislation and judicial develop-
ment of rules and guidelines. Throughout this article, but especially in Part III, I
rely upon information and views conveyed to me by the seven judges interviewed for
this project in the summer and fall of 2010 and in early 2011.
3. Ibid.
4. Class Proceedings Act, 1992, SO 1992, c 6 [CPA].
5. Ontario, Law Society of Upper Canada, Rules of Professional Conduct, online: <http://www.
lsuc.on.ca/media/rpc.pdf> [Rules].
6. 1 will refer mainly to the Rules, ibid, though the analysis applies equally to other provincial codes.
7. According to David Tanovich, role morality is "the set of norms, standards and values that
govern the conduct of individuals when acting as lawyers." See "Law's Ambition and the
Reconstruction of Role Morality in Canada" (2005) 28 Dal LJ 267 at 274.
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Finally, I return to the question set out in the introductory paragraphs of this
article, namely, whether existing ethical norms are adequate to address the realities
of class proceedings. In my view, the Rules insufficiently address class action
praxis, and class action jurisprudence has only partially filled the void. I offer
modest proposals for amendment to Ontario's Rules that would more accurately
address the realities of this model of litigation. These amendments would thereby
provide clearer guidance to lawyers, the clients they serve, and the judges who
play such a significant role in the cases that those lawyers prosecute.
There is no question that the class action terrain has its share of ethical
minefields. Lawyers must regularly mediate between self-interest, the interests of
the client, and the public interest. Judges must consistently ensure that the latter
two interests prevail. By critically examining the existing normative framework
of class action lawyering and proposing changes to current rules and guidelines,
I hope to contribute to a better understanding of this minefield, those who
navigate it, and the forces that keep them whole.
I. THE UNIQUE DIMENSIONS OF CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
The American Bar Association, state bar associations, and US academics have
expended great effort, and spilled much ink, calling for ethical reform of class
action lawyering.8 By comparison, little has been written on the topic in Canada-
and almost all of it has been written by practitioners.9 The application of the
8. Not including continuing legal education conference papers, more than two dozen such
articles and proposals have been published in academic journals in the last two decades.
For recent examples, see e.g. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee
on Professional and Judicial Ethics, "Formal Opinion 2004-01: Lawyers in Class Actions"
(2004) 59 The Record 435, online: <http://www2.nycbar.org/Publications/record/
Vol_59_%20no_2.pdf>; Alon Klement, "Who Should Guard the Guardians? A New
Approach for Monitoring Class Action Lawyers" (2002) 21 Rev Litig 25; Geoffrey C Hazard,
Jr, "Modeling Class Counsel" (2003) 81 Neb L Rev 1397; Geoffrey P Miller, "Conflicts of
Interest in Class Action Litigation: An Inquiry into the Appropriate Standard" (2003) U
Chicago Legal F 581; Susan D Carle, "How Should We Theorize Class Interests in Thinking
About Professional Regulation?: The Early NAACP as a Case Example" (2003) 12 Cornell
JL & Pub Pol'y 571; Nancy J Moore, "Who Should Regulate Class Action Lawyers?" (2003)
5 U Ill L Rev 1477; David J Kahne, "Curbing the Abuser, Not the Abuse: A Call for Greater
Professional Accountability and Stricter Ethical Guidelines for Class Action Lawyers" (2006)
19 Geo J Legal Ethics 741.
9. Paul Perell, "Class Proceedings and Lawyers' Conflicts of Interest" (2009) 35 Adv Quarterly
202; G6rald Tremblay, Shaun Finn & Phelps Turner, "Breathing in the Vital Air: Advocating
an Ethics-Based Approach to Attorney Fees in the Class Action Context" (2008) 5 Can Class
Action Rev 98; Allan C Hutchinson, "Who Are the 'Clients'? (And Why It Matters)" (2005)
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usual codes of conduct to class proceedings has not been the subject of discussion
either at the regulatory level or among bar associations.1" This relative paucity
of critical analysis may be due in large part to the more recent pedigree of class
actions in Canada. It is perhaps also a manifestation of a generally more belated
focus on legal ethics as a subject of academic study."
What are the peculiarities of representative actions that give rise to ethical
challenges? To answer this question, I turn to both US and Canadian writing.
on the subject. There are significant similarities between US and Canadian class
action models. Indeed, the OLRC's proposed statute, which was almost entirely
reflected in the Ontario legislation enacted ten years later, was modelled on the US
federal class action regime. The US literature on the ethical challenges presented
by class action lawyering is, therefore, worthy of some serious consideration.12
Additional insights are gleaned from Ontario class actions judges themselves,
specifically those who took part in a series of interviews for this study. Seven
judges in three Ontario cities who are currently, or were formerly, designated
class action judges met with me in 2010 and 2011 to discuss legal ethics and class
actions. 3 Their candid views about class actions are helpful in understanding
84 Can Bar Rev 411; Michael PA Carabash, "Ethical Conduct for Class Counsel in Ontario"
(2006) 3 Can Class Action Rev 617; Cara Faith Zwibel, "Settling for Less? Problems and
Proposals in the Settlement of Class Actions" (2004) 1 Can Class Action Rev 165; Michael P
Abdelkerim,"Class Counsel's Ethical Obligations" (2004) 18 Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues
105.
10. There is one narrow exception. In August 2000, the Canadian Bar Association issued
"Guidelines for Lawyers Acting for Survivors of Aboriginal Residential Schools" in response
to third party reports of misconduct on the part of lawyers in western Canada. See Canadian
Bar Association, "Guidelines for Lawyers Acting for Survivors of Aboriginal Residential
Schools" (CBA Resolution 00-04-A, carried as amended by the Council of the Canadian Bar
Association at the Annual Meeting held in Halifax, 19-20 August 2000) [CBA Guidelines],
online: http:l/www.cba.org/cba/sections-abor/main/00-04-a.aspx. The CBA Guidelines
sought to ensure that rules of conduct adequately protected particularly vulnerable class
members-the survivors of Aboriginal Residential School abuse. Subsequently, the LSUC
issued its own guidelines, modelled after the CBA guidelines, to address recruiting tactics,
lack of competence, and inappropriate fee arrangements. See The Law Society of Upper
Canada, Guidelines for Lawyers in Cases Involving Claims ofAboriginal Residential School
Abuse, Toronto: LSUC, 2003, online: <http://rc.lsuc.on.calpdf/equity/
guideline.aboriginal.res.pdf>. Not all law societies adopted the protocol.
11. Adam M Dodek, "Canadian Legal Ethics: Ready for the Twenty-First Century at Last"
(2008) 46 Osgoode Hall LJ 1. In particular, Dodek notes that class actions are an
underdeveloped area of legal ethics scholarship (ibid at 45-46).
12. Nevertheless, it is important not to assume that the same features and dangers of class
proceedings described in the US commentary have been imported here wholesale.
13. Three judges were interviewed in person, the rest by telephone. The judges formally
6 (20111 49 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
judicial approaches to the ethical questions that arise in this litigation. For ease
of analysis, I have grouped the distinguishing features of class proceedings into
three general categories: the entrepreneurial litigation problem, the adversarial
void problem, and the absent client problem.
A. THE ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION PROBLEM
There is no question that class actions are entrepreneurial in nature.1" The viability
of class actions rests on the willingness of lawyers to take on group claims that
individually would be uneconomical to prosecute, but which in their aggregate
may yield significant damage or settlement awards. Class proceedings legislation
in both the United States and Canada provides for contingency fees based on a
multiplier (or lodestar, as it is known in the United States), or percentage of fee
calculation, or both. 5 The economic incentives built into class action regimes
are said to increase access to justice. 6 Given their entrepreneurial nature, however,
plaintiffs' counsel have a heightened financial self-interest in the timing and con-
tent of the settlement of any action. 7 They can avoid the risk of no fee recovery
and maximize hourly returns by settling early in the litigation, particularly when
the contingency fee is calculated on a percentage of recovery basis (rather than a
multiplier applied to hourly rates times the number of hours docketed).
It could be argued that contingency fees actually encourage ethical conduct
because they ensure counsel maximizes recovery for the class. This argument,
however, is subject to three criticisms. First, it is premised on the notion that
counsel fees will always be calculated as a percentage of a very large sum of money
that is otherwise distributed to the class. However, counsel can still obtain a
substantial fee in coupon settlements (where coupons that can be used toward
the purchase of the defendant's products are distributed to class members)
consented to be interviewed on the condition of anonymity in accordance with the
University of Windsor's Research Ethics Board approval of this project. Any information
that may tend to identify the judges has been excluded from this article, and the judges
themselves are referred to as Respondents. All interview notes are on file with the author.
14. Fantl v Transamerica Life Canada (2009), 95 OR (3d) 767 at para 66 (CA) [Fantl, CA].
15. See e.g. CPA, supra note 4, ss 33(1), (4).
16. Fantl, CA, supra note 14 at para 67.
17. In one of the earliest and most frequently cited decisions on the criteria for settlement
approval, Sharpe J (as he then was) referred to class counsel's "obvious" and "significant
financial self-interest in having the settlement approved." Dabbs v Sun Life Assurance Corp
(1998), 40 OR (3d) 429 at para 32 (Gen Div). One of the interviewed judges put it this
way: "A lawyer with a healthy self-interest will naturally try to maximize his fee. The judge
has to be vigilant that the class's interests are not compromised." Interview of Respondent 7
(23 February 2011) (Respondent 7].
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and cy prs distributions to charities (where the settlement funds are paid to
charitable institutions that are not parties to the litigation). Both of these types
of distributions take the place of direct monetary compensation to the plaintiff
class and confer only nominal (if any) benefits on the class members. The fee may
also be divorced entirely from the funds ultimately distributed to class members
by way of a claims process that results in modest take-up by the class, so that
recovery-maximization is not tied to lawyers' remuneration at all. It is not
accurate to say, therefore, that if class members get nothing, the lawyer gets nothing.
While an individual client may still be victimized by an unscrupulous lawyer who
overcharges for her services, unlike most class members the individual client has
the power to terminate the retainer agreement. Individually, class members and
representative plaintiffs cannot use the threat of termination as leverage; neither
of them has to support a proposed settlement for it to be approved by the court, 8
and neither may unilaterally remove counsel. 9
Second, the timing of the settlement may still be a source of conflict between
counsel and class members. Early resolution may be attractive to a lawyer but less
than optimal for the class, or vice versa.2" Most commentators (but fewer judges)
recognize that it is class counsel, not the representative plaintiff or class members,
who control the litigation.2' The timing and form of settlement, therefore, is
largely dictated by counsel, not the class, and thus theoretically could be driven
more by economic self-interest and risk aversion than the best interests of the
class members. Moreover, as just noted, a class action settlement need not have
the approval of class members or even the representative plaintiffs. Conversely, in
18. Support of the settlement proposal by the representative plaintiff is but one factor in a long
list of criteria considered by the judge at a, fairness hearing. Gilbert v Canadian Imperial Bank
of Commerce (2004), 3 CPC (6th) 35 at paras 9-11 (Ont Sup Ct).
19. Although representative plaintiffs may not unilaterally terminate their relationship with class
counsel, they may seek a court order achieving the same ends. See Lau v Bayview Landmark
Inc (2004), 50 CPC (5th) 113 (Ont Sup Ct) [Lau]. Lau is a rare case in which one of two
representative plaintiffs successfully moved for the removal of class counsel who had failed to
prosecute the claim with diligence. In ordering the removal of counsel, Cullity J commented
that such an order "must be considered to be an extraordinary exercise of the powers
conferred by section 12 of the CPA. It should be made only when the circumstances compel
it" (ibid at para 38). Two other such cases are discussed in Part II.
20. Susan P Shapiro, Tangled Loyalties.. Conflict of Interest in Legal Practice (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 2002) at 13.
21. Haney Ironworks Ltd v Manufacturers Life Insurance (1998), 169 DLR (4th) 565 at para 30
(BC SC) ("...the reality is that these actions are to a large extent driven by counsel..."). But
see Fanti, CA, supra note 14 at para 44 where Winkler CJ stated, "The representative plaintiff
in a class action lawsuit is a genuine plaintiff, who chooses, retains and instructs counsel and
to whom counsel report."
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traditional litigation, an action can only be settled with the consent and instruc-
tions of the client. In light of class counsel's role as "financier," "creditor," and
"joint-venturer,'" 2  the stakes are simply too high for counsel to relegate control
of the litigation to a plaintiff with a nominal interest and zero risk. How class
counsel finances the litigation is not a matter of disclosure either to the court
or to the client based on existing rules of conduct. 23 Yet, one can imagine how
pressure exerted by bankers, private lenders, or law partners might influence class
counsel's strategy and decision making.
The third and most obvious response to the ethical justification for con-
tingency fees is that the lawyer's financial stake in the class action is out of all
proportion to any individual class member's interest. Rarely is this the case in
traditional, individual litigation, even if prosecuted on a contingency fee basis.
Whatever the temptation to prefer one's own interests in the usual solicitor-client
relationship, the temptation is far greater in class action litigation-if not "almost
irresistible."" Whether or not one would go so far as Charles Wolfram in stating
that professional ethics are at greatest risk in class actions or that ethical conduct
in class actions is "beyond reform," it is undoubtedly true that, as he writes, "the
riches of Croesus are held out as the reward to any lawyer with the client, money,
skill, and pluck to try."2
22. Charles Silver, "Merging Roles: Mass Tort Lawyers as Agents and Trustees" (2003) 31 Pepp L
Rev 301 at 302, quoting John C Coffee, "Kutak Symposium: Professional Responsibility and
the Corporate Lawyer" (2000) 13 Geo J Legal Ethics 331 at 340.
23. As Michael P Abdelkerim has pointed out, the duty of disclosure owed to clients when
advising them refers only to matters affecting the client's financial interests, not the risks
affecting the lawyer's interests. See "Class Counsel's Ethical Obligations" (2004) 18 Windsor
Rev Legal Soc Issues 105. The extent of third party financing of class actions is unknown,
but it has existed since the first class action settlement was approved in 1995. In that case,
the judge approved a consortium of third party investors, but the details of the arrangement
remain under seal. See Nantais v Telectronics Proprietary (Canada) Ltd (14 September 1995),
Windsor 95-GD-31789 (Ont Gen Div). See also Valerie Lawton, "Investors betting lawsuits
will bring big payoffs: Lawyer helps to finance class action cases," Toronto Star (22 February
1998) A3. Only very recently has a handful of plaintiffs' lawyers sought court approval
of funding agreements with an Irish commercial funder. See Metzler Investment GMBH
v Gildan Activewear Inc (2009), 179 ACWS (3d) 765 (Ont Sup Ct) [Metzler]; Dugal v
Manulife Corporation (2011), 105 OR (3d) 364 (Sup Ct) [Duganl.
24. Louis W Hensler III, "Class Counsel, Self-Interest and Other People's Money" (2004) 35
U Mem L Rev 53 at 69 ("The class action mechanism places counsel in aposition of almost
irresistible temptation").
25. "Mass Torts-Messy Ethics" (1995) 80 Cornell L Rev 1228 at 1233.
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B. THE ADVERSARIAL VOID PROBLEM
An adversarial void is created when defence and class counsel agree on a settle-
ment and jointly seek the court's blessing of the proposal. TIhat is, neither counsel
for the class nor counsel for the defendant has any incentive to contest the merits
of the proposed settlement, and they are no longer adversaries. Our justice
system, however, is premised on partisan lawyers submitting opposing arguments
and evidence to judges who decide which of the competing positions is the most
persuasive. T-he adversarial void present in class action settlement approval
hearings creates a systemic risk of collusive behaviour between opposing counsel
to the potential disadvantage of class members.
Class action legislation attempts to guard against the risks to absent class
members by requiring that the parties seek court approval of the proposed
settlement.26 As judges charged with assessing the fairness of proposed setdements
or the reasonableness of a class counsel fee have readily admitted, however, they
have a very difficult task.27 They are institutionally ill-equipped to act as inquisitors,
culturally uncomfortable with departing from their traditional position as neutral
arbiters,28 and unable to act as advocates for the class.29 In the United States, the
Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure explicitly
recognizes that the fairness hearing "lacks the illumination brought by an adver-
sary process."" As a consequence, some US courts have stated that the role of the
26. Fantl v Transamerica Life Canada (2008), 166 ACWS (3d) 1045 at para 53 (Ont Sup
Ct) [Fantl, Sup Ct] ("One reason for requiring Court approval of abandonments,
discontinuances, and settlements in certified or uncertified class proceedings is to ensure that
the interests of class members have not been sacrificed to the interests of the representative
plaintiff and, or class counsel" [sic]).
27. Smith Estate v Money Mart (2010), 94 CPC (6th) 126 at para 33 (Ont Sup Ct).
28. Such discomfort is not limited to the class action context. In a study of attitudes and
practices regarding judicial interviewing of children in the family law setting, fewer than
half of the Ontario judges surveyed had ever interviewed a child, and those who had done
so expressed concern about their lack of training for undertaking such an activity. See
e.g. Nicholas Bala & Rachel Birnbaum, "Why judges should meet kids more often," The
Lawyers Weekly (2 July 2010) 9 at 12 ("It is clear that the 'culture of the court' affects judicial
attitudes and practices").
29. In a discussion of the inadequacies of the adversarial system vis-'-vis class actions and the
need to adopt an inquisitorial approach, Howard M Erichson argues that "the settlement
class action fairness inquiry ... must be undertaken with a level of independent judicial
scrutiny-and an unwillingness to rely solely on the litigants' presentations-that is strongly
suggestive of inquisitorial justice." See "Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice" (1999)
87 Geo Q 1983 at 1995.
30. Hensler, supra note 24 at 92, n 248, quoting Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure 8 (September 2002) at 3.
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judge at a fairness hearing is that of "fiduciary" to the class,"' a view not shared by
Canadian courts. However, both Canadian and US judges and scholars, including
the judges I interviewed, agree that our courts are designed to function in an adversarial
process, not to engage in inquisitorial investigations. 32 As one of the interviewed
judges unambiguously stated, "We spend all of our professional lives engaged
in an adversarial process. [Presiding over class actions] is the only time in my
judicial life where I have encountered an inquisitorial function."33 The inability,
or unwillingness, of judges to be true inquisitors on behalf of the class raises the
possibility that unethical conduct may remain unchecked.
C. THE ABSENT CLIENT PROBLEM
In representative litigation involving mass harm, lawyers do not know, let alone
have regular contact with, their clients. TIhe absent client phenomenon compounds
the difficulties that exist in ordinary litigation in monitoring a lawyer's conduct.
As suggested above in Part I(A), class counsel are effectively in control of the
litigation and are free to make all of the important decisions in the case to a far
greater extent than is expected or acceptable in non-representative litigation.
The absent client problem manifests itself in many ways, starting with the
fundamental ethical rule that lawyers communicate with their clients and seek
instructions .31 In a class action, however, it is usually impossible to consult with
each class member, let alone to seek and follow each member's instructions. In
turn, class members cannot perform the traditional client's role of monitoring
the lawyer's conduct.35 A lack of communication compounds the ethical dangers
of financial self-interest and other conflicts of interest and also "diminishes
31. Reynolds v Beneficial National Bank, 288 F3d 277 at 279-80 (7th Cir 2002).
32. Hensler, supra note 24 at 98-99. See also Catherine Pich6, "A Critical Reappraisal of Class
Action Settlement Procedure in Search of a New Standard of Fairness" (2010) 41 Ottawa L
Rev 25. Pich6 promotes a more inquisitorial role for the reviewing judge.
33. Interview of Respondent 3 (23 June 2010) [Respondent 3]. Respondent 6 put it differently,
stating, "We struggle to look for what is not there that should be there. To do this, we must
ask questions. That is not inquisitorial, but it is being proactive. Unlike other litigation,
there is no adversary on a settlement approval. All of us miss that." Interview of Respondent
6 (5 November 2010) [Respondent 6]. Respondent 7 spoke of being "worried about what's
not being said" at the approval hearing, stating that "we have to probe and make sure we're
getting the straight goods." Respondent 7, supra note 17.
34. Rules, supra note 5, r 2.01. Rule 2.01 defines a "competent lawyer" as one who communicates
"at all stages of a matter in a timely and effective manner that is appropriate to the age and
abilities of the client."
35. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note 8 at 436.
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community notions of justice."36 If counsel can recommend a settlement over
the objection of the representative plaintiff, the rule requiring lawyers to obtain
instructions from their client before proceeding is devoid of any real power.
Apart from the absent client phenomenon, there is also the peculiar dynamic
between representative plaintiffs and class counsel. Representative plaintiffs are
often recruited by class- counsel rather than self-identified. They are usually
indemnified by class counsel against the risk of an adverse cost award, and they
typically have very small damage claims. Having been invited to participate, and
with little to gain and nothing to lose, representative plaintiffs almost never
challenge the decisions of their counsel. This view has been endorsed emphatically
by, among others, Alon Klement: "Named representative plaintiffs have proven
to be merely figureheads: ineffective, passive, unsophisticated, and completely
disregarded by both courts and class attorneys."37 Judges in the United States
have similarly remarked that "the primary feature that distinguishes [such law-
suits] is there's no client. It's the rare case where a real plaintiff takes an interest.
Most of the time, the clients are purely nominal and cases are driven entirely by
lawyers."38 One judge interviewed for this article observed that in some cases,
the representative plaintiff is "a nominal plaintiff and the lawyers are driving the
litigation."39 In contrast, in ordinary litigation those with interests in the action
are usually active participants"0 with a correlative incentive to monitor the man-
ner in Which the litigation is conducted.
Applying the usual rules of professional conduct in this context-where the
client is both figuratively and literally absent-is highly problematic. By way of
example, conflicts of interest between class members are common, especially in
actions involving very large numbers of individuals with varying degrees of harm
and whose legal claims vary in strength. Such a conflict is best illustrated by class
members who have negligence claims, some of which fall outside the limitation
period." The class members whose claims are initiated within the limitation
36. Kenneth R Feinberg, "'Lawyering in Mass Torts" (1997) 97 Colum L Rev 2177 at 2179.
37. Supra note 8 at 27-28. See also Susan P Koniak & George M Cohen, "In Hell There Will
be Lawyers Without Clients or Law" (2001) 30 Hofstra L Rev 129; Jonathan R Macey &
Geoffrey P Miller, "The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:
Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform" (1991) 58 U Chicago L Rev 1;
Wolfram, supra note 25; Hazard, supra note 8.
38. US District Court Judge Vaughn Walker, quoted in Lynne Bolduc, "A Case Without a
Client: The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995" (1996) 43 Fed Law 33 att 35.
39. Respondent 7, supra note 17.
40. Fantl, Sup Ct, supra note 26 at para 49.
41. This was the scenario in Richard v British Columbia (2007), 159 ACWS (3d) 340 (SC)
[Richard, 2007, SC], leave to appeal to BCCA granted, 162 ACWS (3d) 893. The appeal was
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period have a stronger legal position and would benefit from excluding the weaker
claims (particularly at the settlement negotiation stage). A lawyer representing a
class comprised of both groups of claimants would be faced with a clear conflict.
Rules governing conflicts, however, are premised on clients providing informed
consent to a course of action in order for the lawyer to be able to proceed.
2
Such consent is simply not attainable in class actions, where class members are
diffuse and numerous, if not altogether unidentifiable.43 More critically, as will
be developed in Part II, it is unclear both who the client is in a class proceeding
and from whom instructions ought to be obtained. In the event of conflicting
instructions, it is neither practical nor desirable for class counsel simply to
withdraw representation altogether as the Rules command.M
Another area of tension exists regarding fees. Courts assessing the reason-
ableness of a fee request by class counsel have relied upon the usual list of factors'
5
enumerated in the Canadian Bar Association's Code of Professional Conduct,
which includes "any relevant agreement between the lawyer and the client.""
Such reliance leads to the court's deference to the terms of the fee agreement. 7
As I have argued elsewhere,' 8 however, deference to the parties' freedom of contract
is misplaced in the class action context. The fee agreement entered into by the
proposed representative plaintiff is fundamentally different from the retainer
agreement usually entered into by non-representative clients for at least two
reasons. First, it is unlikely that representative plaintiffs, especially those recruited
ultimately abandoned. The case is discussed in Part II of this article.
42. See e.g. Rules, supra note 5, r 2.02. The solution in some instances has been to appoint
separate class counsel for subclasses at the settlement stage.
43. The communication problem is made impossible in cases involving class members outside
of Canada. See e.g. Hinton v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2009] 1
FCR 476 (CA), affg in part [2008] 4 FCR 391. The Federal Court of Appeal certified the
action on behalf of those who paid processing fees to the Department of Citizenship and
Immigration Canada with respect to various immigration visas.
44. Rules, supra note 5, r 2.04(3).
45. Gariepy v Shell Oil (2003), 123 ACWS (3d) 949 at para 13 (Ont Sup Ct) (listing eight
factors to be considered, including the "client's expectation as to the amount of the fee").
46. The Canadian Bar Association, Code of Professional Conduct, ch XI "Fees," online: <www.cba.
org/CBAlactivities/pdf/codeofconduct06.pdf>. See also Rules, supra note 5, r 2.08.
47. See e.g. Cassano v Toronto Dominion Bank (2009), 98 OR (3d) 543 at para 63 (Sup Ct)
[Cassano]. See also 799376 Ontario Inc (Cob Lonsdale Printing Services) (Trustee of) v Cascades
Fine Papers Group (2008), 173 ACWS (3d) 695 at para 6 (Ont Sup C) [Cascades] (where
Leitch J was "prepared to approve this fee request because it is consistent with the retainer
agreement entered into with the representative plaintiff").
48. Jasminka Kalajdzic, "Access to a Just Result: Revisiting Settlement Standards and Cy Prks
Distributions" (2010) 6 Can Class Action Rev 215.
KALAJDZIC. CLASS ACTION PRAXIS 13
by class counsel, have any incentive to engage in rigorous negotiations of the
appropriate fee, nor the leverage with which to do so effectively. Second, even if
they did, the agreement binds class members who are not parties to it.19
This example illustrates the essence of what is different about class actions,
namely the identity of the client and the nature of her relationship with the lawyer.
While courts recognize that class members are owed some ethical duties, the
general view remains that a traditional solicitor-client relationship exists between
class counsel and the representative plaintiff, with the attendant traditional
duties. The more one views the representative plaintiff as a traditional client, the
more likely an operating assumption exists that traditional duties are owed to
that representative plaintiff. But this ignores the elephant(s) in the room: What
about the class members? Further, what about the pre-certification, putative
class members? And what about the post-certification class members? Ultimately,
determining which ethical duties are owed depends in large part upon who we see
as the client. It is to that fundamental question that we now turn.
II. WHO IS THE CLIENT?
The ethical risks peculiar to, or more pronounced in, class action litigation that
have been recounted above are common to both the US and Canadian regimes.
Class action legislation in both countries shares many similarities, especially its
entrepreneurial orientation, and gives rise to the same incentives and ethical risks.
In both jurisdictions there appears to be widespread acknowledgment that class
action litigation is different and produces inherent conflicts of interest and other
ethical considerations. Most pronounced in both countries is the recognition that
class counsel's financial self-interest conflicts with the best interests of the class.
A close reading of the jurisprudence on both sides of the border, however,
reveals a fundamental divergence in views on a key normative issue: They differ
as to the status of the class representative as a "genuine plaintiff." Canadian
49. There is an altogether different justification for deferring to the terms of the retainer
agreement rooted in economics: Plaintiffs' lawyers decide to pursue a particular action after
having assessed the risks of going forward-risks which are reflected in the contingency fee
contemplated by the retainer agreement. Class action lawyers, the argument goes, need the
certainty and predictability of being paid in accordance with that fee, or else they will be
incapable of providing access to justice in all but the easiest of cases. Whatever the merits of
this argument, it is independent of any justification for respecting the contractual freedom of
representative plaintiffs and their counsel, for assuming that representative plaintiffs generally
have real bargaining power, or for employing the usual factors for assessing an ethically
appropriate and reasonable counsel fee.
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jurisprudence clings to the notion of the representative plaintiff as a genuine client.
Accordingly, to date in Canada, rules of conduct have been held to apply to class
actions with only minor modifications.
Class action litigation may be unique in many ways, but in Canadian case
law the role and duties of class counsel are still largely perceived in terms of the
traditional lawyer-client relationship. With little variation, the traditional client
paradigm continues to reign, affecting not only how judges view the ethical
duties that flow from this paradigm, but also how judges interpret class proceed-
ings legislation. The case law betrays an internally contradictory view of class
actions as a legal process. On the one hand, there is a ready willingn!ess to see
the peculiar dynamics at play, such as when a judge rejects the fiction that it is the
plaintiff, not her counsel, seeking a costs award"0 or when courts refuse to accept that
a proposed, uncertified class action is just "any old action," but rather is a case "with
ambition."" On the other hand, judges have relied on the traditional solicitor-client
paradigm to help resolve disputes between competing class counsel by stating
that "the prosecution of the action rests squarely with the representative plaintiff.
The representative plaintiff in a class action lawsuit is a genuine plaintiff, who
chooses, retains and instructs counsel and to whom counsel report." 2 Two recent
judgments-arguably the most important decisions to date in Canada on ques-
tions of class action ethics-illustrate the tension between the recognition of the
unique features of class action of litigation and an adherence to a very traditional
view of litigation and lawyering.
A. THE GENUINE PLAINTIFF FIRES CLASS COUNSEL: FANTL
In Fanti v Transamerica Life Canada,3 the law firm representing the pre-certification
class dissolved, and the lawyer who had primary responsibility for Mr. Fantl's
action formed his own firm while his three former partners formed a firm of
their own. Mr. FantI served a notice of change of solicitors on lead counsel, having
chosen to stay with the three-partner firm.54 The former lead counsel sought
50. McCracken v Canadian National Railway, [2010] OJ no 4650 (QL) at paras 7-12 (Sup Ct)
[McCracken].
51. MacKinnon v National Money Mart (2004), 33 BCLR (4th) 21 at para 33 (CA).
52. Fantl, CA, supra note 14 at para 44.
53. Fantl, Sup Ct, supra note 26.
54. In opposing the change of solicitors, class counsel argued that Mr. Fanti was motivated solely
by his personal friendship with a lawyer at the new firm. Mr. Fantl countered that class
counsel was committing professional misconduct by not accepting the change of solicitors,
but did not dispute that his close friendship with the other lawyer was the principal reason
for the change. Ibid at para 38.
KALAJDZIC, CLASS ACTION PRAXIS 15
an order requiring the representative plaintiff to accept him and his new firm as
solicitors of record or, alternatively, to replace Mr. Fand as proposed representative
plaintiff with another class member. The judge at first instance, Justice Paul Perell
of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, dismissed the application, thus allowing
the representative plaintiff to sever his relationship with the lawyer who had, for
a number of years, prosecuted the action.
The respondents resisted the application on the basis that well-established
principles governing a client's right to have a lawyer of his own choosing applied
to the class action context in exactly the same way as they would in a regular
individual proceeding and that lead counsel therefore did not even have standing
to bring the application. 5 Justice Perell rejected the argument, noting that the
"dynamics of the lawyer client relationship in an ordinary action are different
from the dynamics of that relationship in a class action."5 6 He acknowledged
that it may be necessary to "adjust carefully the historical rules that govern the
relationship between lawyer and client for the imperatives of a class proceed-
ing" and held that this adjustment preserves the court's jurisdiction to consider
whether the proposed representative plaintiffs choice of counsel was adequate. 7
Nevertheless, he held that the court should defer to the plaintiffs choice unless
that choice is "inadequate" and that "[t]he test of representation for the class in a
class action is one of adequacy not of superiority and it is not a test of what is in
the best interests of the class or proposed class."5 8 Such a conclusion flows from
his operating paradigm and the following chain of logic:
" "the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 is designed to have a genuine plaintiff
with an individual claim against the defendant";59
* "there is a genuine lawyer and client relationship between the repre-
sentative plaintiff and the solicitor of record";
6
* "[o] ne implication from the presence of a genuine plaintiff is that
the traditional rules that govern the relationship between a lawyer
and a plaintiff should be. the starting point";"
* "the Court should not alter the traditional rules of this solicitor
55. Ibid at paras 43-48, 60.
56. Ibidat para 49.
57. Ibidat para 8.
58. Ibidat para 108.
59. Ibidat para 61.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid at para 68.
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and client relationship, unless there is some reason arising from the
particular needs of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992";62
" after certification, "there is a solicitor and client relationship with
attendant duties between the solicitor of record and both of the
representative plaintiff and the class";
63
* prior to certification, there is a "sui generis relationship between
lawyer and potential class members, and the Court has the jurisdic-
tion to protect the interests of the proposed class members."6"
The Court of Appeal for Ontario affirmed Justice Perell's decision and endorsed
this reasoning.6"
Who is this genuine plaintiff? The CPA and other provincial statutes do
not speak of a genuine plaintiff. Rather, they speak of a representative plaintiff
who is able to "fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class."66
The three usual factors considered when determining adequate representation
are (1) the plaintiff's motivation to prosecute, the claim; (2) her ability to
bear the costs of the litigation; and (3) the competence of her counsel. 67 At
a time when indemnity agreements between counsel and client, or between
representative plaintiff and the Class Proceedings Fund, are ubiquitous, 6 the
second factor in the adequacy test is moot. The third factor, competence of
counsel, is undoubtedly crucial in the certification analysis but is unhelpful as
a determinant of just how genuine the plaintiff is. This leaves us with motiva-
tion-can a plaintiff only be genuine if properly motivated to prosecute the
claim? If so, what is proper motivation, and how does a judge determine if the
plaintiff has it?
One can imagine any number of motivations that would instinctively be con-
sidered improper, rendering a person both inadequate as a class representative and
insufficiently genuine as a plaintiff. The person may be motivated by the promise of
favourable treatment as compared to other class members. She could be acting under
duress or prosecuting an action under false pretences to blackmail the defendant, for
62. Ibid at para 69.
63. Ibid at para 81.
64. Ibid at para 80.
65. Fantl, CA, supra note 14.
66. CPA, supra note 4, s 5(1)(e)(i).
67. Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc v Dutton, [2001] 2 SCR 534 at para 41.
68. Drady v Canada (AG) (2008), 164 ACWS (3d) 32 (Ont Sup Ct). In this case, Cullity J
commented that "it is almost unheard of... for there to be no agreement, or understanding,
between plaintiffs and class counsel in respect of the payment of costs if the action is
unsuccessful;' (ibid at para 57).
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example: It would be a rare case, however, where a judge would have sufficient facts
and evidence to ground an inference of fraudulent intent or duress.
The genuine or real plaintiff is described only sporadically in the case law.
Such a plaintiff must have "an interest the same as others in the class" and must
not be impecunious.69 In Fantl, Justice Perell did not explain why he found Mr.
Fantl to be a genuine plaintiff or how he arrived at that determination. Rather,
he expressed Mr. Fantl's qualifications in the negative: Mr. Fantl was "not a place-
holder plaintiff for the entrepreneurial interests of the lawyer or law firm that has
so much at stake in the class action."7 1 That Mr. Fantl was recruited by the original
law firm to act as representative plaintiff did not make him a place-holder. That
he had had limited communication with former lead counsel about the litigation
also did not affect his status as.genuine plaintiff.71 Yet these very same facts have
disqualified other potential representative plaintiffs. In both British Columbia
and Ontario, courts have held that recruitment of a representative plaintiff for
an action that was the product of the lawyers' research strongly evidenced a lack
of necessary interest, independence, and incentive on the part of the plaintiff to
fulfill her duties to the class. 72
The judges interviewed for this article echoed similar skepticism about the
ability of a recruited plaintiff to represent the interests of the class independently.
According to one judge, "There are cases where it's a joke, frankly, to think the
client is doing anything. The client was recruited and just accepts instructions."13
Conversely, another judge disagreed with the assertion that solicitation alone
signalled that a plaintiff is not genuine. Rather, what is key is that "they have a
stake in the resolution of the common issues."71 This same judge, however, queried
whether, by reason of the existence of indemnification against adverse costs, a
plaintiff would ever have "a real stake."7 1
The extent of a representative plaintiff's involvement in the action is also
not a reliable measure of genuineness. In Chartrand v General Motors, 6 Justice
69. Smith v Canadian 7ireAcceptance Ltd (1995), 22 OR (3d) 433 at para 71 (Gen Div).
70. Fand, Sup Ct, supra note 26 at para 104.
71. Ibidat para38.
72. Chartrand v GeneralMotors (2008), 173 ACWS (3d) 694 (BCSC) [Chartranal; Singer v
Schering-Plough Canada Inc (2010), 87 CPC (6th) 276 (Ont Sup Ct); Poulin v FordMotor
Co of Canada (2006), 153 ACWS (3d) 30 at para 85 (Ont Sup Ct) [Poulin]. In Poulin, the
plaintiff was described as a "pawn" of the counsel who recruited him and ultimately found
not to be an adequate representative plaintiff (ibid at para 85).
73. Interview of Respondent 1 (15 June 2010) [Respondent 1].
74. Interview of Respondent 2 (23 June 2010) [Respondent 21.
75. Ibid.
76. Supra note 72.
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DJ Martinson concluded that the plaintiff was inadequate because she had been
recruited by class counsel and was too passive. Although familiar with the basic
elements of the lawsuit, Ms. Chartrand had not taken part in the decision to
amend the claim other than to "discuss" it" and was not familiar with either the
litigation plan or the financial arrangements' between her counsel and the US at-
torneys who were involved. 78 In another action involving automobile deductibles,
however, the representative plaintiffs had an "incomplete understanding of their
obligations with respect to costs" but nevertheless were found to be adequate. 9
After reviewing the transcripts of the plaintiffs' cross-examinations-in which
their limited understanding of a representative plaintiff's cost exposure was made
plain-Justice Haines noted;
It should perhaps be remembered in cases such as these that no representative
plaintiff will have much of a stake in the ultimate outcome since the potential
recoveries are so modest. Therefore reality dictates that the test for adequacy of
the representative plaintiff is in large part a test of the capacity of class counsel to
properly pursue the action in the best interests of the members of the class.
80
Fantl brought the question of whether the client or the lawyer controls class
action litigation to the attention of the mainstream media.81 Justice Perell concluded
that the representative plaintiff is the client and as such can hire and fire class
counsel so long as counsel was adequate but irrespective of the best interests of
the class.82 Justice Perell also concluded that if the representative plaintiff is genuine
he controls the litigation, and class counsel is accordingly ethically bound to
accept the change in solicitors. The case law, however, is at best unclear-perhaps
even inconsistent-on the fundamental question of what constitutes a.genu-
ine plaintiff. The only meaningful criterion offered to determine genuineness is
whether the plaintiff is properly motivated to prosecute the action. Yet as we have
77. Ibidat para 78.
78. Ibid at paras 102, 107, 110-11.
79. Segnitz v Royal & Sun Alliance Ins Co of Canada (2003), 126 ACWS (3d) 394 at para 7
(Ont Sup Ct) [Segnitz]. The class action was ultimately dismissed as a result of the insurer's
successful summary judgment motion. See David Polowin Real Estate v Dominion of Canada
General Insurance (2005), 76 OR (3d) 161 (CA).
80. Segnitz, supra note 79 at para 14.
81. Sandra Rubin, "Who's driving the bus here?," National Post (13 May, 2008), online: <http://
www.reportonbusiness.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080513.wlawmain05l3/BNStory/
robLawPage/home/>.
82. Interestingly, the provisions of r 23 of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended in
2003, compel a different result. "If more than one adequate applicant seeks appointment, the
court must appoint the applicant best able to represent the interests of the class." Fed R Civ P
23(g)(2 ).
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seen, not all judges view recruitment, lawyer-initiated class actions, and plaintiff
participation as determinative of motivation. The lack of consensus renders the
next question even more complicated: Does the genuine plaintiff enjoy a tradi-
tional lawyer-client relationship with class counsel? In contrast to much of the
US case law, Canadian courts almost universally answer in the affirmative. The
Richard v British Columbia83 decision exemplifies this approach.
.B. CLASS COUNSEL FIRES THE GENUINE PLAINTIFF: RICHARD
In Richard, Mr. Mcarthur, one of two representative plaintiffs, applied to remove
class counsel and appoint new lawyers for the class on the grounds that class
counsel had acted unethically. The claim had been initiated in 2002 by the law
firm Poyner Baxter against the province on behalf of all living persons who were
sexually, physically, emotionally, and psychologically abused while they were resi-
dents in Woodlands School (a government operated residential facility for persons
with mental and psychiatric disabilities).'The action was certified in 2005. Several
months later, the British Columbia Court of Appeal released its decision in Ar-
ishenkoffv British Columbia," another residential schools case, which was critical
to the Richard case on a point of law. The Court of Appeal held that the Crown
could not be liable for torts committed prior to 1 August 1974, the date on which
the Crown Proceedings Act"5 came into force. Mr. Mcarthur had been a resident
at Woodlands prior to August 1974, while the other representative plaintiff, Mr.
Richard, had been a resident of and abused at Woodlands after that date.
Within a year, after protracted negotiations with class counsel-negotiations
that the lawyers had agreed not to disclose to Mr. Mcarthur-the defendant
provincial government delivered a final offer of settlement that provided com-
pensation to the post-August 1974 class members, but which did not recognize
any right of action for those abused prior to that date. T-he settlement offer
was disclosed to Mr. Mcarthur, who retained independent legal counsel. Mr.
Mcarthur then instructed Poyner Baxter to reject the offer. Contrary to those
instructions, class counsel first brought an application for an order that two
subclasses be created, with Mr. Mcarthur representing the pre-August 1974 subclass.
The application was denied.86 Class counsel then sought to amend the class
definition to narrow the class to post-August 1974 Woodlands residents, removing
83. Richard, 2007, SC, supra note 41.
84. (2005), 47 BCLR (4th) 1 (CA), leave to appeal to SCC refused, [2005] SCCA No 556.
85. SBC 1974, c 24.
86. Richard v British Columbia (2006), 152 ACWS (3d) 1004 (BCSC) [Richard, 2006].
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Mr. Mcarthur as a representative plaintiff altogether. Mr. Mcarthur applied
concurrently for an order removing Poyner Baxter as counsel for the plaintiffs.
Justice Butler granted Mr. Mcarthur's application and denied the motion
to amend the class definition. At paragraph seventeen of his reasons, the judge
recounted the allegations of conflict of interest and breach of duty of loyalty
proffered by Mr. Mcarthur.87 Class counsel negotiated with the defendant in
secret, did not follow instructions to reject the settlement, applied to create
subclasses without instructions, filed affidavits that stated Mr. Mcarthur did not
qualify as a settlement class member under the terms of the proposed settlement
agreement, and took the position at the hearing of the earlier motion that Mr.
Mcarthur had no right of action. Poyner Baxter did not. contest these facts.
Indeed, the firm admitted that had these same steps been taken in the context
of representing an individual client, they would be "contrary to the Professional
Conduct Handbook."88 When acting as class counsel, however, "other consider-
ations must be taken into account."89 Class counsel argued that it owed its duty
of loyalty and other obligations as a solicitor to the class as a whole and that "the
system can only work on this basis."9
Justice Butler held that, after certification, class counsel clearly has all the duties
and obligations that arise under a solicitor-client relationship and that these are
owed to the class as a whole. 1 Relying on R v Neil,9 2 Justice Butler cited three
dimensions to the duty of loyalty: avoidance of conflicting interests, duty of zealous
representation, and the duty of candour with clients on matters relevant to the
retainer. Given these duties, Poyner Baxter could "not ignore the wishes of the
class representatives in making fundamental litigation decisions and [could] not
prosecute [the] action with unfettered discretion."93 Justice Butler reached this
conclusion notwithstanding his finding that Poyner Baxter was motivated only'
by its views as to what was best for the class as a whole and by its assessment that
Mr. Mcarthur was providing instructions on the basis of his own personal inter-
ests. " Interestingly, soon after Justice Butler released his decision, the proposed
settlement was revoked, and the defendant moved to amend the class definition
to exclude persons who suffered abuse prior to August 1974. The motion was
87. Richard, 2007, SC, supra note 41.
88. Ibidat para 18.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid at para 28.
91. Ibid at paras 23, 42.
92. [2002] 3 SCR 631.
93. Richard, 2007, SC, supra note 41 at para 42.
94. Ibid at paras 43-44.
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granted" in what was described as "the inevitable outcome" of Arishenko. 6 A
settlement agreement was approved for the post-1974 class members in 2010."7
The traditional lawyer-client paradigm drives the result in Richard. Yet,
Justice Butler was aware of the different dynamics and obligations that operate
in the class action context. Indeed, he cited a number of US authorities that
challenge the application of the traditional paradigm to class actions. In one
case cited by Justice Butler, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated
definitively that "it is inappropriate to import the traditional understanding of the
attorney-client relationship into the class action context by simply substituting
the named plaintiffs as the client."98 In another case, the same court commented
that the "duty owed to the client sharply distinguishes litigation on behalf of one
or more individuals and litigation on behalf of a class."99 Despite these authorities-
and a recognition that the authorities were relevant to the BC class action regime
and the case at hand-Justice Butler maintained the position that Poyner Baxter
was obligated to follow the instructions of the representative plaintiff and was
precluded from continuing to act by reason of its conflict of interest and breach
of duty of loyalty to Mr. Mcarthur.
Had Justice Butler not viewed the representative plaintiff through the
traditional client lens, another outcome might have b een possible. If, as will be
explored below, the client in the class action is the class, Justice Butler could have
decided the motion in a manner that maintained fidelity to the Neil principles
while at the same time recognizing that it is inappropriate to import the traditional
understanding and analysis of the solicitor-client relationship into the conduct
95. Richard v British Columbia (2008), 165 ACWS (3d) 817 (BCSC), affd (2009), BCLR (4th)
87 (CA), leave to appeal to SCC refused [2009] SCCA No 274.
96. Ricbard v British Columbia, [20101 BCJ no 1363 (QL) at para 10 (SC).
97. Ibid. The settlement is, by all accounts, very favourable to the class members. Under a claims
process, class members submit their claims in writing and can present evidence not ordinarily
admissible. Compensation is comparable to tort damages and is not affected by limitations
defences. The class members need not adduce evidence of harm, only evidence concerning
the event which caused the injury. There is no ceiling to the settlement fund. A robust notice
campaign was also devised. Whether this settlement is superior to the one Poyner Baxter was
prepared to submit for court approval is unknown.
98. Pettway vAmerican Cast Iron Pipe, 576 F (2d) 1157 (5th Cir 1978), cert denied, 439 US
1115 (SC 1979) [Pettway].
99. Parker vAnderson, 667 F (2d) 1204 at 1211 (5th Cir 1982). Commentary to r 23 by the
Advisory Committee echoes this view: "[T] he primary responsibility of class counsel ... is
to represent the best interests of the class. The rule thus establishes the obligation of class
counsel, an obligation that may be different from the customary obligations of counsel to
individual clients." Fed R Civ P 23(g)(1)(B) Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules (2003),
online: Legal Information Institute, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/ACRule23.htm>.
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of class actions. Justice Butler was quite rightly concerned about class counsel
prosecuting the action "with unfettered discretion.""0 One need not impose
the traditional client-lawyer relationship and its attendant duties, however, in
order to avoid limitless discretion. Class counsel's discretion is fettered by his
obligations to the class as a whole and by the strictures of the CPA. That is, he
must satisfy the judge that the proposed settlement is in the best interests of the
class. A representative plaintiff truly invested in the action and able to advance
the interests of the class independently would presumably be in a position to
object to the fairness of the settlement. If meaningful objections are few and far
between,"0 then it is time to revisit and revise the objection process; it is not an
argument for importing wholesale the duties of loyalty and candour that flow
from non-representative client representation.
C. IMPACT OF THE UNRESOLVED CLIENT QUESTION
Both Fant and Richard have implications beyond the interests of the lawyers and
parties in those two cases. Determinations of the rights of representative plaintiffs
to select and then discharge class counsel, irrespective of the best interests of the
class or the investment of time and money by the original class counsel, are
significant for all stakeholders in class action litigation.
The cases also highlight the need to reconcile the absent client problem
discussed in Part I with the continuing centrality of the genuine plaintiff in
class action litigation. The concept of genuine plaintiff requires more clarity and
precision not only because it determines the ethical duties of class counsel but
also because it influences class proceedings at key stages. It dictates, for example,
Chief Justice of Ontario Warren K. Winkler's conclusion that the "representative
plaintiff in a class action lawsuit is a genuine plaintiff, who chooses, retains and
instructs counsel and to whom counsel report."102 It has a direct bearing on the
adequacy of representation analysis at the certification hearing. The genuine
plaintiff paradigm also impacts judicial approaches to fee approval. In a number
of cases, judges have placed great weight on the fee agreement signed by the
representative plaintiff when assessing the fairness of the requested counsel fee.103
100. Richard, 2007, SC, supra note 41 at para 42.
101. Empirical support for this statement and for the institutional disincentives for rigorous
objections is explored in Kalajdzic, supra note 48 at 232-36.
102. Fand, CA, supra note 14 at para 44.
103. See e.g. Cassano, supra note 47 at para 63, where the court stated
They had accepted their retainers on the basis of a fee calculation that would vary
directly according to the degree of success that was achieved. ... [T]here was nothing
in the manner in which the proceeding was conducted that, in my judgment, would
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In one recent decision, the court went so far as to describe its role at the fee
approval stage as "not to fix a fee by consideration of all the evidence but to decide
whether the [retainer] agreement operates reasonably in the context given the fee
proposed."1"' In other cases, however, judges place little weight on the fee agree-
ments10 5-which entitle class counsel to the amounts requested-on the basis
that in class actions there is an "absence of a client who will be directly affected
and concerned with the level of fees claimed." 1 6 'The case law is simply not clear
as to when a fee agreement, even if entered into with an absent client, attracts
deference and when it is merely one factor of many to be considered. Similarly,
the genuine client paradigm necessarily impacts the value a judge will place on
the representative plaintiffs endorsement of a proposed settlement--even if the
endorsement comes by way of a pro forma affidavit.
Continued insistence on the genuine plaintiff paradigm further complicates
the status of the other class members. The nature of the relationship between
putative class members and class counsel is still largely undefined. Early Canadian
jurisprudence did not treat class members as clients of class counsel prior to
certification,' a view that was shared by commentators and the Chief Justice of
Ontario."8 Since then, more nuanced approaches have emerged. Various courts
refer to the relationship as sui generis-a potential solicitor and client relationship
exists prior to certification, and it attracts some responsibilities on the part of
counsel. 9 For example, class counsel cannot prejudice the interests of pre-cer-
tification class members, and it is for the court to ensure that those interests are
justify a refusal to approve a fee determined in accordance with the terms on which the
retainers were accepted.
See also Cascades, supra note 47 at paras 6, 9.
104. Parsons v Coast Capital Savings Credit Union, [2009] BCJ no 711 (QL) at para 9 (SC), citing
Commonwealth Investor Syndicate Ltd v Laxton (1994), 94 BCLR (2d) 177 at para 47 (CA).
105. Martin v Barrett (2008), 168 ACWS (3d) 643 at para 48 (Ont Sup Ct).
106. Ibid at para 52.
107. Pearson vlnco (2001), 57 OR (3d) 278 at para 18 (Sup Ct). More recently, Sigurdson J
took the same view: "It appears that generally, the solicitor-client relationship. prior to the
certification proceedings is between the solicitor and the representative plaintiff, not the
solicitor and the putative class members." Burnett Estate v St Jude Medicallnc (2008), 165
ACWS (3d) 245 at para 48 (BCSC).
108. See e.g. Warren K Winkler & Sharon D Matthews, "Caught in a Trap: Ethical
Considerations for the Plaintiff's Lawyer in Class Proceedings," online: Court of Appeal for
Ontario <http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/coa/en/ps/speeches/caught.htm>. The authors
posit that since there is no actual "class action" before certification, no relationship can exist.
109. Ward-Price v Mariners Haven Inc (2004), 71 OR (3d) 664 (Sup Ct) [Ward-Price]; Fantl, Sup
Ct, supra note 26.
24 [2011 49 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
protected.1 I0 There is some support for the notion that communications between
the potential class member and counsel must be protected by confidentiality,1"
but how this might be reconciled with the weightier duties of loyalty and candour
owed to the representative plaintiff has not yet been explained. Indeed, even the
most experienced class action judges admit that the status of, and responsibilities of
class counsel toward, class members before certification is uncertain and a work
in progress.'' 2
The post-certification status of class members is a bit clearer. Virtually all
courts recognize that a solicitor-client relationship exists between class counsel
and the class at that point in the litigation." 3 The scope of that relationship,
however, remains amorphous and "an area under development.""' One judge
has held that class counsel is not an agent of the class and that there is not a
contractual relationship between them--even if counsel owes fiduciary duties
to class members."' According to another judge, however, the class is the client,
to which is owed all of the obligations that flow from a traditional lawyer-client
relationship."' The case law has not yet explained how the full panoply of these
obligations can be met vis- -vis a large, diffuse group of people with potentially
conflicting interests, many of whom may not even be known to counsel.
For all of these reasons, clarity and consensus regarding the identity of the
client in a class action is needed. Given its entrepreneurial and representative
nature, this form of litigation compels a normative shift vis-fi-vis all of its
participants. The named plaintiff is no ordinary client. The lawyer's clients
include persons not named in the title of proceedings. The judicial role takes on
aspects of inquisitorial legal systems. And the lawyer is zealous advocate, venture
capitalist, and private attorney general in equal measure.
110. Coleman v Bayer Inc (2004), 47 CPC (5 h) 346 at paras 30-36 (Ont Sup Ct).
111. One of the judges in this study insisted emphatically that the solicitor-client privilege applied
to all communications, even those conducted with pre-certification class members. Interview
of Respondent 5 (19 October 2010) [Respondent 5]. See also Hutchinson, supra note 9;
Abdelkerim, supra note 9. For a contrary view, see "The Attorney-Client Privilege in Class
Actions: Fashioning an Exception to Promote Adequacy of Representation", Note, (1983)
97 Harv L Rev 947 (arguing that confidentiality is detrimental to the interests of the class
members as it impedes oversight of lawyers' conduct).
112. Perell, supra note 9. A judge interviewed for this project questioned what suigeneris even
means in this context. Respondent 3, supra note 33.
113. See e.g. Ward-Price, supra note 109; 1176560 Ontario Ltd v Great Atlantic 6& Pacific Co of
Canada (2003), 121 ACWS (3d) 426 (Ont Sup Ct).
114. Perell, supra note 9 at 213.
115. Martin v Barrett, [2008] OJ No 3813 (QL) at para 32 (Sup Ct).
116. Respondent 2, supra note 74.
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III. REGULATING CLASS ACTION ETHICS
A. RULES OF CONDUCT
As discussed above in Part I, US scholars are virtually unanimous in their view
that existing rules of professional conduct do not fit neatly within the class action
paradigm. As Carrie Menkel-Meadow succinctly puts it:
[C] urrent ethical rules ... were not drafted with the special issues of mass tort class
action settlements in mind, and do not, in my view, provide adequate guidance
for how these issues should be resolved. Our legal system, and ethical rules, must
confront the tensions between our ideals of individual justice and the reality of a
need for "aggregate" justice. 117
A range of responses to this reality is apparent in the US literature. Com-
mentators have variously proposed that an entirely new code of conduct be
drafted to govern class action litigation, " " that existing rules be revised," 9 or
that additional commentary be added to the rules, thereby leaving the bulk of
any reform to judicial interpretation. 12 As part of this discussion, a number
of theoretical models have been offered with respect to the class action client.
Examples include conceptualizing the class as an entity client 2 ' and treating class
members analogously to incompetent clients122 or as quasi-clients. 23
Apart from the many individual calls by legal ethicists for special attention
to class actions, there have also been a number of collective and governmental
efforts in the United States to address the perceived "lawlessness" of class action
practice. 2 The Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
began an intensive study of class actions in the early 1990s, 6ulminating in
117. "Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road" (1995) 80
Cornell L Rev 1159 at 1172.
118. Koniak & Cohen, supra note 37.
119. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 117.
120. Moore, supra note 8 at 1481.
121. Ibid at 1484.
122. Hazard, supra note 8 at 1399.
123. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note 8 at 440, noting that "[c]lass
members might be considered quasi-clients, owed those duties to the extent consistent with
the law and practicalities of class actions." Allan Hutchinson makes the same suggestion in
his brief discussion of class actions. Supra note 9.
124. Koniak & Cohen, supra note 37 at 114.
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recommendations for amendments to rule 23 in 1996125 and 200 1.126 The Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995127 was passed to address widespread abuses
in securities class actions (principally those related to so-called professional
representative plaintiffs and strike suits). 128 In 1997, the American Bar Association
created the Commission on the Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
to undertake a comprehensive review of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.129
In a series of hearings and written submissions, the Commission was urged
to adopt a separate class action ethics rule. 3 ' The Class Action Fairness Act
of 200511' was then enacted to "amend the procedures that apply to consider-
ation of interstate class actions to assure fairer outcomes for class members and
defendants." 3 2 The Federal Trade Commission has considered the subject of
consumer class actions and legal ethics, and various law schools have held confer-
ences devoted to the subject.131
US scholarship reflects the richness of these debates. Much has been written
about the unique ethical dimensions of representative litigation. Various theories
have been offered regarding how best to conceptualize the class action client(s).
On one point, however, there is virtual unanimity. Readers would be hard-
pressed to find a US scholar, lawyer, or judge who maintains that the American
Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct apply comfortably to class
125. For a detailed account of the Committee's work and proposed amendments, see John K Rabiej,
"The Making of Class Action Rule 23-What Were We Thinking?" (2004) 24 Miss CL Rev
323 at 345-68, n 119, citing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Appellate, Civil, and Criminal Procedure 45 (1996). As Rabiej explains, the Committee
ultimately declined to pursue most of the proposed amendments because support for reform
was fractured within both the defence and plaintiffs bar, and the committee has historically
resisted implementing any rule amendments that did not enjoy broad consensus (ibid at 367).
126. Proposed revisions were published for comment in 2001. Almost all of the proposals were
promulgated by way of amendments to r 23 in 2003. See ibid at 368-90.
127. 15 USC § 78u-4 (2004).
128. Hensler, supra note 24 at 81-82.
129. Center for Professional Responsibility, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Chicago:
American Bar Association, 2001.
130. Moore, supra note 8 at 1479. The Commission ultimately declined to adopt separate ethics rules.
131. Pub LNo 109-2, 119 Stat 4 .
132. Ibid, Preamble. For a discussion of the statute and its intended goals, see William V Sasso &
Jacqueline A Horvat, "Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: A Canadian Perspective" (2005) 2
Can Class Action Rev 63.
133. The proceedings of one such conference, held at Georgetown University, have been published
at (2004) 18 Geo J Legal Ethics 1161. For the Federal Trade Commission's workshop papers,
see online. <http://wwwftc.gov/bcp/workshops/classaction>.
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action lawyering. By way of example, Charles Wolfram,'3 4 Susan Koniak, 135
Gerald Cohen, 136 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, 137 Nancy Moore,
38 Geoffrey Miller, 139
and Geoffrey Hazard "-all highly regarded legal ethicists-have argued force-
fully that "the usual rules of legal ethics simply cannot apply to the class action
context."11 While there is great variance between such scholars regarding how
best to theorize class actions and whether reform should be driven by profes-
sional rules committees or class action jurisprudence, there is at least consensus
on the irreconcilability of traditional ethical rules with class action praxis. US
case law reflects the same conclusion. In the oft-cited Corn Derivatives decision
by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, Judge Adams wrote that
"courts cannot mechanically transpose to class actions the rules developed in the
traditional lawyer-client setting context."
' 14 2
To date, there have been no such organized efforts to evaluate legal ethics
in the Canadian class action context, despite the similarities between the
ethical rules and the class action regimes in both jurisdictions. The LSUC and
its various subcommittees have not discussed-let alone offered commentary
or proposed amendments to rectify-the disjunction between various rules
of conduct and the realities of class proceedings.'43 Legal commentators and
judges alike have assumed that the Rules of Professional Conduct apply, even if
only as a "starting point."14 4 Why has there been so little discussion in Canada
of the application of ethical rules to class action litigation as compared to our
southern neighbours?
One possible reason is that we have not seen the same degree of publicly
134. Supra note 25.
135. Koniak & Cohen, supra note 37.
136. Ibid.
137. Supra note 117.
138. Supra note 8.
139. Supra note 8 at 582 ("courts have not articulated coherent principles to guide their analysis.
... Nor have the rules of professional responsibility made up for the deficit: ethics rules
relating to conflicts of interest are predicated on a notion of client consent that is unworkable
in the context of class litigation").
140. Supra note 8 at 1402 ("[nlone of the rules governing the ordinary client-lawyer relationship
works very well when applied to class counsel").
141. Coffee, supra note 22 at 340.
142. In Re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litigation, 748 F (2d) 157 at 163 (3d Cir 1984). See also
Pettway, supra note 98.
143. Confirmed by way of email correspondence and telephone conversation with Jim Varro,
Policy Counsel, Law Society of Upper Canada (17 June 2010).
144. Carabash, supra note 9 at 618.
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scandalous behaviour on the part of class action lawyers.1" In the absence of
widespread concern over class action abuse, there is scant motivation to debate
the application of legal ethics and rules. Some judges share this view, with an
important caveat, as expressed by one interviewed judge: "I don't get the
impression that there is a lot of immoral conduct out there-but how would you
know?" 14 A lack of highly publicized examples of blatantly unethical conduct
is a weak justification for not engaging in the kind of analysis and dialogue this
article encourages. Ethical rules are not solely aimed at remedying prior acts of
misconduct; they also exist to guard against the potential risks of such misconduct.
More broadly, legal ethics can be aspirational. 17 In any event, the absence of scandal
does not prove that unethical practices, even on a small scale, do not take place.
A second possible explanation for the lack of academic, regulatory, and
public interest in class action ethics is that Canadian industry, insurers, and
both sides of the class action bar may be less well-funded and influential than
their US counterparts, who lobbied the Republican and Democratic parties heavily
in the mid-1990s and early 2000s when tort and litigation reforms were high on
Congress's agenda.' Yet another possible reason is that the various law societies,
to the extent that issues of class action ethics are raised, may have concluded
that the designated class action judges of each province are better positioned to
formulate rules.
In my view, however, an equally plausible explanation is a normative one.
As explored in the previous Part, Canadian jurisprudence continues to subscribe
to the view that the representative plaintiff is a genuine client of class counsel, to
whom all of the usual duties are owed. Evident in both my discussions with class
action judges and their written judgments is a deep reticence to admit that the
rules which govern the usual solicitor-client relationship do not apply in the class
action context. Whatever ethical issues may arise in class actions, the dominant
thinking is that the usual professional codes of conduct will address them. To
145. Only one Canadian class action lawyer appears to have attracted some notoriety. See
Jonathan Gatehouse, "White man's windfall," Macleans (4 September 2006), online: <http://
www.macleans.ca/article.jsp?content=200 6 0911_133025_133025>. The byline reads, "The
biggest winner in the residential schools settlement is not a native. He's a lawyer named Tony
Merchant, and his firm's take could hit $100 million. No wonder he has so many critics."
146. Respondent 1, supra note 73.
147. Alice Woolley, "Introduction to Legal Ethics" in Alice Woolley et al, eds, Lawyers'Ethics
and Professional Regulation (Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2008) at 7 ("Lawyers' ethics
addresses the moral or ethical aspirations of the practising lawyer-the type of decision-
making processes and decisions which an ethical lawyer will employ and make").
148. For a journalistic account of these events, see Patrick Dillon & Carl M Cameron, Circle of
Greed (New York: Broadway Books, 2010).
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the extent that such rules are deficient or unhelpful in class proceedings, judges
will fill the gap. At least one US commentator agrees with this approach on the
basis that class action judges, not ethics code drafters, are qualified to determine
the appropriate relationships between class counsel, the representative plaintiff,
and the rest of the class. 149 It is not clear whether the same rationale has produced
a deliberate policy choice in Canada to defer to jurisprudential fashioning of
class action ethical rules. In the absence of advancements in rules of conduct, it
nevertheless becomes necessary for judges to fill the void.
In Part III(B), below, I examine instances of this judicial rule making. Such
a case-by-case approach is favoured by some of the class action judges I inter-
viewed for this project. Whether we can do better than this incremental and at
times haphazard development of ethical guidelines for class action litigation is
a discussion that I hope this article will generate. As has been stated elsewhere,15
case law is a limited source of guidance on what is required for lawyers to be
ethical, in part because cases tend to address specific facts rather than general
principles. More crucially, case law does not generally fulfill the aspirational
objectives of legal ethics. Thus, I offer suggestions for possible regulatory reform
in the final section of this article.
B. JUDICIALLY CONSTRUCTED RULES
US literature is replete with suggestions for reform to curb class action abuse
including, for example, court-appointed private monitors, independently
represented plaintiff committees, and the use of academics as Special Masters. In
Canada, however, very little serious consideration has been given to adopting new
tools with which to confront class actions, despite the fact that the adversarial
context that normally operates in a Canadian courtroom does not occur to the
same degree in representative actions. Notwithstanding the discomfort with
their role at the settlement approval hearing expressed by all of the interviewed
judges--described by two interview subjects as "the loneliest job in the world" ' -
no sustained academic or legislative reform debate has taken place to address the
problems faced by class action judges. 2 Invariably, the solution to any particular
149. Moore, supra note 8 at 1501.
150. Woolley et al, supra note 147 at 8.
151. Respondent 2, supra note 74; Respondent 3, supra note 33.
152. A handful of commentators have addressed different facets of the ethics problem. Garry
Watson has proposed the appointment of a monitor charged with protecting class members'
interests and having full rights of discovery (as described in Zwibel, supra note 9 at 190-91).
Kalajdzic, supra note 48, and Pich6, supra note 32, have also argued for reform of judicial
approaches to the settlement approval process.
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ethical problem is described as resting squarely with the class action judge, who
is expected to weed out unsavoury behaviour, protect the interests of the class,
and address conflicts of interests as they arise.
The judges interviewed for this study all pointed to the strictures of the
CPA as a source of ethical guidance. It is true that various sections of the CPA
contemplate judicial oversight as a check against unethical conduct. For example,
section 5(1)(e) requires that the certification hearing judge be satisfied that the
representative plaintiff does not have a conflict of interest with other class members
in order to be certified as appropriate. Section 12 gives the case management
judge wide jurisdiction to make any order necessary for the proper conduct of
the action; pursuant to this section, judges may determine how best to resolve
conflicts as they arise. Section 29 compels the fairness hearing judge to approve
the proposed settlement, and sections 32 and 33 require court approval of the
class counsel fee. These approval processes have developed under the case law to
require more than a rubber stamping by the judge, though there is a wide spectrum
of approaches and varying degrees of scrutiny."3 According to one judge, "the
mere existence of the rule requiring settlement approval is what is important. If
you removed the settlement approval factor, you would open the gates for people
tobe totally self-serving."' i 4
Pursuant to their oversight functions under the CPA, judges supervising class
actions have attempted to resolve a number of ethical ambiguities insufficiently
addressed by the Rules. Some of these decisions concern the relationship between
class counsel and the representative plaintiff. For example, some communication
with the representative plaintiff is required, though how much is not entirely
clear.'55 More recently, Justice Cullity confirmed that class counsel must disclose
the risks of adverse costs to a potential representative plaintiff if counsel is not
153. Compare Winkler J's statement in McCarthy v Canadian Red Cross Society (2001), 106
ACWS (3d) 193 at para 21 (Ont Sup Ct) ("The Court is not equipped, nor should it be
required, to engage in a forensic investigation into the material or to mine the record to inform
itself Counsel must direct the Court to all relevant information that would impact on the
Court's determination" [emphasis added]) to that of Sharpe J in Dabbs v Sun Life Assurance,
[1998] OJ no 1598 (QL) at para 21 (Gen Div) ("In view of the fact that the purpose of
the exercise is to ensure that the interests of the unrepresented class members are protected,
the court is called upon to play a more active role than is called for in strictly adversarial
proceedings" [emphasis added]). Sharpe J's approach mirrors that of some US courts,
including the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which has stated that "in order to protect the
rights of absent class members, the court must assume a far more active role than it typically
plays in traditional litigation." Epstein v MCA, Inc, 50 F (3d) 644 at 667 (1995), rev'd on
other grounds (sub nom Matsushita Electric Industrial v Epstein) 516 US 367 (1996).
154. Respondent 1, supra note 73.
155. Richard, 2007, SC, supra note 41.
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indemnifying the client against those costs."5 6 Class counsel's indemnity has been
held not to violate ethical prohibitions relating to champerty and maintenance."I
On the question of financial self-interest, judges have clarified that it is.
not unethical for class counsel to negotiate a settlement and their proposed fee
simultaneously, despite the "divided loyalties" such negotiation entails." 8 Sub-
sequent decisions have specified, however, that for ethical reasons the proposed
settlement agreement cannot be conditional upon the court's approval of the
proposed fee."5 9
Courts have also attempted to mitigate the dangers of conflict of interest be-
tween the representative plaintiff and other class members. Some judges have held
that the representative plaintiff must not be related to class counsel, 6 ' though
others have departed from the rule.' 6' One judge has denied a representative
plaintiff compensation for work performed in researching and vetting appropriate cy
prks recipients on the basis that it would be unseemly for the representative plaintiff
to receive compensation when other class members get nothing.'62 Another judge
has held to the contrary. 63
Financial self-interest for both plaintiff's counsel and the defendants may lead
to an improvident settlement or sloppy claims process. To guard against these risks,
there is growing acceptance of the need for judges to supervise settlements even
after their formal approval,' 6 a role clearly envisioned by the CPA6' and contemplated
156. Attis v Ontario (Minister of Health) (2010), 323 DLR (4th) 309 (Ont Sup Ct).
157. Holmes v London Life Ins Co of Canada (2007), 40 CPC (6th) 167 (Ont Gen Div).
158. Dabbs v Sun Life Assurance (1998), 38 OR (3d) 781 at para 8 (Gen Div), Winkler J.
159. Stewart v General Motors of Canada Ltd (2008), 172 ACWS (3d) 572 at para 22 (Ont
Sup Ct); Garland v Enbridge Gas Distribution (2006), 152 ACWS (3d) 397 (Ont Sup Ct)
[Garland, Sup Ct], varied on consent (2008), 162 ACWS (3d) 891 (Ont CA).
160. Kerr v Danier Leather (2001), 108 ACWS (3d) 773 (Ont Sup Ct) at paras 68-73, rev'd on
other grounds 77 OR (3d) 321 (CA), rev'd [200713 SCR 331; Bourgoin v Bell Canada,
[20071 JQ no 14560 (QL) at paras 49-52 (Que Sup Ct) (where the representative plaintiff
was rejected for being the brother of class counsel).
161. Cassano, supra note 47 at para 58 (Sup Ct). At the fairness hearing, Cullity J held the marital
relationship between the representative plaintiff and one of the lawyers on the plaintiffs
counsel team was not a factor to be considered in setting the fee since the representative
plaintiff had been approved as an appropriate representative plaintiff. There was no discussion
of this possible conflict of interest in the certification decision.
162. Sutherland v Boots Pharmaceuticals PLC (2002), 21 CPC (5th) 196 at para 22 (Ont Sup Ct).
163. Garland, Sup Ct, supra note 159.
164. Baxterv Canada (AG) (2006), 83 OR (3d) 481 at para 12 (Sup Ct) ("The court has an
obligation under the Class Proceedings Act ... to protect the interests of the absent class
members, ... in ensuring that the administration and implementation of the settlement are
done in a manner that delivers the promised benefits to the class").
165. CPA, supra note 4, s 26(7).
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by the OLRC.1'66 Nevertheless, judges do not regularly order counsel to report
take-up rates of settlement distribution schemes in order to determine the extent
of the benefit realized by the class. 67
Taken as a whole, these developments point to the weakness of relying on a
case-by-case development of ethical rules. Generally, judges will address ethical
issues only if counsel intentionally or inadvertently bring them to the judges'
attention. It is quite possible, therefore, that judges see only the tip of the iceberg.
Where judges have addressed ethical issues in the face of situations in which it is
difficult to apply the usual codes of conduct, the formulation of ethical guidelines
has been at best unpredictable and at worst inconsistent.
TIhe judges interviewed for this article agreed that the judiciary plays a key
role in identifying possible unethical conduct,'68 yet they also universally
admitted that this function is difficult to execute in light of the absent client
and adversarial void phenomena. All judges interviewed had contemplated, at
one point or another, appointing a third party expert to help analyze a proposed
settlement. One judge indicated that the nature of the action may dictate the
appointment of sophisticated counsel to "act as the judge's sounding board."' 69
Another judge who no longer presides over class actions went further and said,
"If I were still doing this, I would not conduct a fairness hearing without having
the class separately represented."7 0 Such views find favour with US judges;
indeed, the Federal Judicial Center's Pocket Guide for Judges recommends that
they allow non-profit entities, government bodies, and state attorneys general to
participate actively in fairness hearings to provide assistance to the court. 7 1 In the
spring of 2011, the Court of Appeal for Ontario for the first time signalled an
166. OLRC Report vol 1, supra note 2 at 168 (recognizing that because "class lawyers, acting out of
self-interest, may occasionally attempt to make a settlement that is unfair to class members,"
the judiciary must be given effective discretion to supervise all settlements).
167. Jasminka Kalajdzic, Access to Justice for the Masses? A Critical Analysis of Class Actions in
Ontario (LLM Thesis, University of Toronto Faculty of Law, 2009) at 131-33, online:
<https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/ 1 807/18780/6/KalajdzicJasminka_.200911_
LLM Thesis.pdf> (noting results of a class counsel survey, in which many of the respondents
indicated they did not or could not calculate take-up rates and observing that judicial orders
to provide take up information are uncommon in the case law, though they do exist).
168. For example, Respondent 4 stated that while the CPA speaks of the representative plaintiff
and class counsel guarding the interests of class members, ultimately it is "the role of the
judge to look out for the class's interests." Interview of Respondent 4 (24 June 2010)
[Respondent 4].
169. Ibid.
170. Respondent 3, supra note 33.
171. Barbara J Rothstein & Thomas E Willging, Managing Class Action Litigation: A Pocket Guide
for Judges (Washington: Federal Judicial Center, 2009) at 15.
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openness to the involvement of an amicus, court-appointed monitor, guardian ad
litem, or independent counsel in class action fee approval hearings. 72
Despite the lack of public discussion (or controversy) surrounding class
actions in Canada, some class action judges hold surprisingly strong views about
the ethics of class actions as a legal institution. One judge said, "This is not real
access to justice. It's a business. ... It's not supposed to be lawyers championing
for profit.""17 As noted by the interviewed judges, however, such philosophical
objections to the entrepreneurial orientation of class action praxis do not necessarily
equate with a view that class action lawyers generally act unethically. To the
contrary, one opined that "the overwhelming majority of lawyers are honourable
and have integrity."'7 4 Nevertheless, the interviewed judges see a "need to discuss
what it means to act ethically" in the class action context,'75 even absent the,
kind of scandals described in US scholarship and the popular press. As a result,
the time has come for law societies" 6 to provide clearer guidance to lawyers and
judges, alike in several key areas, which I discuss below.
C. BEGINNING THE DISCUSSION: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
The judges I interviewed were unanimous in their view that there is a void of
ethics regulation in the context of class actions and that it is appropriate to begin
a discussion of the issues raised in this article. As the class action bar grows and
new lawyers enter the field, it is all the more pressing that the conversation ensues
and that clear guidelines for conduct are set.177 Such guidelines should emanate
not only from case law, as has occurred to date, but also from law societies. The
latter have the advantage of being able to formulate rules that give counsel an
opportunity to consider their ethical obligations ex ante and thereby avoid
unnecessary and expensive court proceedings.17 8 Of course, ex ante regulation
172. Smith Estate v National Money Mart (2011), 199 ACWS (3d) 1077 at paras 20-40 (Ont
CA) [Smith, CA]. Interestingly, the Court of Appeal also suggested that a motion judge
could invite intervention from the LSUC itself "in regard to the interpretation of its Rules of
Professional Conduct" (ibid at para 38).
173. Respondent 4, supra note 168.
174. Respondent 1, supra note 73.
175. Ibid.
176. Three interview subjects stated that the LSUC, not judges, should have the primary
responsibility in formulating ethical rules and norms. Respondent 2, supra note 74;
Respondent 5, supra note 111; Respondent 6, supra note 33.
177. Respondent 6, ibid.
178. Examples abound. One can imagine how many resources were expended by the original
plaintiffs lawyers in Richard, 2007, SC, supra note 41, before they were removed as class
counsel, or the cost of retaining independent counsel to pursue appeals of the class counsel
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also has the distinct advantage, at least in theory, of preventing professional
misconduct, inadvertent or otherwise.
To begin ethical reform, definitional clarity on the identity of the client in
class proceedings is needed as an organizing principle. The scope of other duties,
including loyalty, confidentiality, and the avoidance of conflicts of interest, is
directly connected to the client question. "The more ephemeral the client, the
more abstract and ultimately empty the lawyer's .duty to that client will be. ...
The law needs to make the class client coherent by explicating how its parts fit
together and how they are designed to interact with the lawyer."'179
The definition of client in the class action context would undoubtedly be
layered. The Commentary to the Rules might specify that pre-certification class
members are clients in a limited sense; in that event, class counsel would owe a
duty of loyalty that prohibits taking steps that prejudice the litigation rights of
the pre-certification class. Class counsel would also be obligated to maintain rea-
sonable communications with the pre-certification class about the progress of the
case and the fee arrangement entered into with the named plaintiff. Confidentiality
might not be warranted in all circumstances, but, as discussed below, rule 2.03
could make clear that counsel would be obligated to inform class members that
communications between them are not subject to solicitor-client confidentiality.
The same duties could be owed to the named plaintiff pre-certification. In
addition, rules 2.02 (Quality of Service) and 2.04 (Conflicts of Interest) could
specify that financial self-interest always impairs the lawyer's ability to give candid
advice. At the retainer stage, therefore, the rule could require that the plaintiff
obtain independent legal advice before signing the fee agreement and describe the
process for obtaining that advice: who engages independent counsel, who pays
their fee, and the extent of the due diligence required of independent counsel.18
Given the dynamics of many, if not most, plaintiff-class counsel relationships, it
should not be assumed that plaintiffs have the sophistication or bargaining power
to contract for these protections..The Canadian Bar Association guidelines that
were adopted for representation of Aboriginal residential school survivors 8' simi-
larly presumed class members to be unsophisticated, albeit for different reasons.
fee decisions in Smith, CA, supra note 172.
179. Koniak & Cohen, supra note 37 at 167.
180. In my view, the fee agreement should be given little, if any, weight when the judge assesses
fair and reasonable compensation for class counsel. Nevertheless, the representative plaintiff
would benefit from independent legal advice about the nature of her obligations to the class,
her rights vis- -vis class counsel, and her exposure to adverse costs if class counsel has not
provided her with an indemnity.
181. CBA Guidelines, supra note 10.
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The LSUC might also want to address the growing trend of obtaining third
party financing of class actions and to assess its possible impact on lawyers' decision
making-a matter of extensive discussion and debate in the United States182 that
has received minimal judicial or public attention in Canada. 8 3 The broader issue
of fee-splitting, of which third party financing is but a subset, is likely to become
more pressing as the trend toward higher adverse costs awards against representative
plaintiffs (in reality, against class counsel) continues. 8" The context; in which it is
ethical for class counsel to split their fee could usefully be explored by the LSUC.
Indeed, judges have already expressed an interest in hearing from regulators on
such issues. In Garland v Enbridge Gas Distribution, for example, at the request of
the motion judge, counsel sought advice from the LSUC on the propriety of fee
splitting with the representative plaintiff (the LSUC declined on the basis that it
did not provide legal opinions).1 85
In the United States, the American Law Institute has added commentary to
the sections related to the representation of organizations that reflect class
considerations.1 16 Ontario's rule 2.02 (1.1) could similarly be amended, if it is
helpful to conceive of the class as an entity client. It should be borne in mind
that, on at least one important issue, it is not: Whereas conflicts of interest can
typically be resolved by reporting up the ladder of organizational clients, no such
hierarchy exists within the class.
Rule 2.03 (Confidentiality) is complicated both by the nature and the various
stages of the class proceeding. Consistent with the law of solicitor-client privilege
that treats pre-retainer communications with lawyers as protected, communications
with pre-certification class members, who have no formal retainer agreement
182. The literature is vast. For a recent and critical perspective, see US Chamber Institute for
Legal Reform, Selling Lawsuits, Buying Trouble: Third Party Litigation Funding in the United
States (2009), online: <http:l/www.instituteforlegalreform.comlimages/stories/documentsl
pdffresearchl/thirdpartylitigationfinancing.pdf>. See also Julia H McLaughlin, "Litigation
Funding: Charting a Legal and Ethical Course" (2007) 31 Vt L Rev 615. A discussion of the
particular ethical argumen'ts for and against third party financing is beyond the scope of this
article.
183. Metzler, supra note 23; Dugal, supra note 23.
184. Perell J rejected the fiction that representative plaintiffs are actually exposed to the risk of
adverse costs: McCracken, supra note 50 at para 7. The trend toward higher adverse costs
orders against class plaintiffs has been noted in a number of articles. See e.g. Jasminka
Kalajdzic, "Consumer (In)Justice: Reflections on Canadian Consumer Class Actions" (2011)
50 Can Bus LJ 356 at 372-74.
185. (30 December 2006), Toronto 94-CQ-50711 (Ont Sup Ct) (inviting submissions or legal
opinion by the LSUC on the interpretation of r 2.08(8)(a)).
186. The American Law Institute, Principles of the Law: Aggregate Litigation (Washington:
American Law Institute, 2010).
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with the plaintiffs lawyer, might enjoy a comparable right in legal ethics. In order
to establish the necessary evidentiary record for certification and for the merits of
the action, however, class counsel may need to rely on information and documents
that originate with the named plaintiff or putative class members. Rule 2.03
could stipulate a default rule that communications are held in confidence and
that it would be incumbent upon class counsel to obtain written confirmation
from the plaintiff or class member where disclosure of such communications is
necessary for the conduct of the action.
Rule 2.08 (Fees and Disbursements) could be revised since in class proceed-
ings reasonableness is already the subject of judicial scrutiny. The commentary
might include an iteration of the relevant criteria for determining reasonableness;
in addition to existing factors, the public benefit of the litigation ought to be
considered. A similar criterion has been employed in the United States where
judges consider the "benefits to a class of people very much in need of help" and
"society['s] stake in assuring that cases which are important but which are not,
from a lawyer's perspective, particularly desirable, are nevertheless undertaken." 87
While the Rules should not dictate how judges exercise their discretion under
sections 32 and 33 of the CPA when approving counsel fees, the commentary to
rule 2.08 could appropriately delineate the acceptable manner of negotiating a
retainer agreement with the representative plaintiff and the factors that ought to
be addressed within the agreement.
Finally, the Rules ought to make explicit the duty of counsel to the court
to make full disclosure of all matters relevant to the proposed certification,
settlement, or trial of the action, including the presence of third party funding
arrangements, indemnity agreements, and any other business arrangements
that give rise to financial self-interest. The duty of full disclosure is necessary if
we are to continue to rely as heavily as we do on judges to oversee the proper
prosecution of these claims on behalf of absent clients. In this regard, the principles
developed on exparte procedures are instructive. 88
187. Bowling v Pfizer, 922 F Supp 1261 at 1281-82 (SD Ohio 1996), aff'd 102 F (3d) 777 (6th
Cir 1996).
188. In addition to the jurisprudence on exparte motions, which universally confirms a duty on the
part of moving counsel to bring all material facts to the attention of the presiding judge (e.g.
United States ofAmerica v Yemec (2003), 67 OR (3d) 394 (Sup Ct), afFd (2005), 75 OR (3d)
52 (Div Ct)), the Commentary to rule 4 of the Rules stipulates that "[w]hen opposing interests
are not represented, for example, in without notice or uncontested matters or in other situations
where the full proof and argument inherent in the adversary system cannot be achieved, the
lawyer must take particular care to be accurate, candid, and comprehensive in presenting the
client's case so as to ensure that the tribunal is not misled." Rules, supra note 5, rule 4.01(1)
Commentary.
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The possible reforms of the Rules proposed here are intentionally minimalist.
A detailed reform agenda requires consultation with the bar, the bench, and
government representatives. Ideally, it should also have an empirical foundation,
informed by the realities of class action praxis. Qualitative and quantitative
investigations of class actions, like the discussion of their ethical dimensions, are
in their infancy in Canada. This article is a call for greater attention to both.
IV. CONCLUSION
The unique aspects of class actions, as opposed to individual or joint client
representation, have been discussed repeatedly in US academic circles. In many
respects, the Canadian commentary on the ethical dimensions of class actions,
though less prolific, replicates the US critiques. Potential conflicts between class
members, between the representative plaintiff and class members, and between
class counsel and the class are readily acknowledged in both literature and case
law. So, too, is the risk of collusive behaviour between class and defence counsel,
who would both benefit from settling an action at bargain-basement sums for
the class and sizeable fees for counsel. While judges and scholars alike point to
the protection afforded by a legislatively mandated court approval process for
certification, settlement, and fees, most also recognize the judge's difficult task
in effectively scrutinizing the merits of the cases or probing the paper record.
Yet, on the question of the application of the ordinary rules of conduct to this
unique form of litigation, Canadian courts-unlike their US counterparts and in
contrast to a vast body of literature on the subject-have largely maintained that
the representative plaintiff is a genuine client to whom the usual ethical duties
are owed.
The lack of engagement by law societies with the question of applying
ordinary ethical rules to class actions has resulted in inconsistent development
of judicial principles. Normative confusion persists because the authorities have
not clearly addressed the question of who is the client in a class action and which
specific duties are owed to that client. Lawyers and class members alike would
benefit from a fulsome discussion of these issues and a concerted effort to reform
professional conduct rules so that they reflect class action praxis. Until then,
judges are left with the unenviable task of building a body of ethical rules and
norms piecemeal. Counsel's self-interest, the public interest, and the interests of
the absent client demand better.

